Orrock v. Appleton Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 35064 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-3-2008
Orrock v. Appleton Appellant's Brief Dckt. 35064
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Orrock v. Appleton Appellant's Brief Dckt. 35064" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1826.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1826
IN THE FILED - COPY 
OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO Enternd on ATS by: - - -, @? 
r 
SCOTT ORROCK, derivatively on behalf of MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. 
-d 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT I-.,, 1 
VS. 
STEVEN R. APPELETON, WILBUR G. STOVER, JR., MICHAEL W. SADLER, 
JAMES W. BAGLEY, ROBERT A. LOTHROP, GORDON C. SMITH, 
WILLIAM P. WEBER, THOMAS T. NICHOLSON and DON J. SIMPLOT, 
and 
MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Delaware corporation, 
NOMINAL DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
Appealedfrom the District Gur t  of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho. in and for ADA Counfy 
Hon DARLA WILLIAMSON, District Judge 
ERIC S. ROSSMAN 
Attorney for Appellant 
RICHARD H. GREENER 
Attorney for Respondents 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page . . 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... 11 
1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................ 1 
A. Nature of the Case .................................................................................................... 1
B. Course of the Proceedings ....................................................................................... 1 
C. Statement of the Facts .............................................................................................. 3 
1 .  Defendants Consciously Disregard Red Flags, Thereby Permitting 
Micron's Involvement in the Conspiracy to Fix the Price of DRAM .......... 3 
2. Even in the Face of an Investigation by the Department of Justice, 
Defendants Deny that Micron Officers Were Involved and Fail to 
Take Action to Hold the Wrongdoers Responsible or to Protect the 
Company from Further Harm ...................................................................... 5 
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................... ; ............................................................. 6 
111. ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................... 7 
A. Standard of Review .................................................................................................. 7 
B. The District Court Erred in Finding that Plaintiff Had Failed to 
Adequately Allege that Demand on Micron's Board Was Futile ............................. 8
1. Legal Standards Applicable to the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Make a Demand .......................................................... ; .............................. 8 
2. There Is a Reasonable Doubt as to the Disinterestedness of a 
Majority of the Board, Rendering Demand Futile ....................................... 9
a. Defendants Appleton, Bagley, Lothrop, Smith and Weber 
Face a Sufficiently Substantial Likelihood of Liability for 
Consciously Disregarding Red Flags and Thereby 
Permitting Micron's Involvement in the Conspiracy to Fix 
.......................................................................... the Price of DRAM 9 
b. Defendants Appleton, Bagley, Lothrop, Smith and Weber 
Face a Sufficiently Substantial Threat of Liability for 
Failing to Seek Redress from Any of the Wrongdoers or 
Protect the Company from Additional Harm ARer Micron 
Admitted Involvement in the Price-Fixing Conspiracy, 
................................................. Further Rendering Demand Futile 17 
c. Defendants Appleton, Bagley, Lothrop, Smith and Weber 
Face a Sufficiently Substantial Likelihood of Liability for 
Consciously Failing to Monitor or Oversee Micron's 
...................................................................................... Operations 21 
IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 23 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page@) 
CASES 
Aronson v. Lewis, 
................................................................................................... 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) 8 
Ash v. McCall, 
................................................ No. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000) 22 
Beneville v. York, 
769 A.2d 80 (Del. Ch. 2000) ............................................................................................... 9 
Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244, (Del. 2000) .............................................................................................. 7,8 
Conrad v. Blank, 
940 A.2d 28 (Dei. Ch. 2007) ....................................................................................... 19, 21 
Guttman v. Huang, 
823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003) ............................................................................................. 9 
Idaho Comm'n on Ifuman Rights v. Campbell, 
95 Idaho 2 15 (1 973) ............................................................................................................ 9 
In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., 
................................................................................ 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003) 10, 13, 15 
In re Biopure Corp. Derivative Litig., 
......................................................................... 424 F. Supp. 2d 305 (D. Mass. 2006) 10, 11 
In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 
........................................................................................... 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) 21 
In re Cendant Corp. Derivative Action Litig., 
....................................................................................... 189 F.R.D. 117 (D.N.J. 1999) 9, 15 
In re Forest Laboratories, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 
450 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ............................................................................... 11 
In re Ramp Networks, Inc. See., 
............................................................................ 201 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 10 
In re Vicuron Pharms., Inc. See. Litig., 
................................................ No. 04-2627, 2005 WL 2989674 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2005) 10 
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 
............................................................................................. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) 13, 17 
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Sews., Inc., 
500 U.S. 90 (1991) .......................................................................................................... 7, 8 
McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 
53 1 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987) ................................................................................................... 7 
Mills v. State, 
732 A.2d 845 (Del. 1999) ................................................................................................... 8 
Osborn v. United States, 
918 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1990) .............................................................................................. 9 
Rules v. Blasband, 
634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993) ............................................................................................. 8, 10 
Rincover v. State Dep't of Fin., Sec. Bureau, 
128 Idaho 653 (1996) .......................................................................................................... 9 
Seminaris v. Landa, 
662 A.2d 1350 (Del. Ch. 1995) ......................................................................................... 10 
Sew. Employees Int'l Union 6 v. Idaho Dep't. of Health & Welfare, 
106 Idaho 756 (1984) .......................................................................................................... 9 
Stone ex. rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 
911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) ..................................................................................... 13, 17, 22 
Young v. City of Ketchum, 
137 Idaho 102 (2002) .......................................................................................................... 9 
1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a shareholder derivative action brought on behalf of Micron Technology, Inc. 
("Micron" or the "Company") against certain of its directors and officers for their roles in the 
conspiracy among the leading DRAM manufacturers to fix the price of DRAM. As discussed in 
detail herein, beginning by at least 2000, defendants, and particularly the members of Micron's 
Board of Directors ("Board"), consciously ignored numerous red flags that would have alerted 
them to Micron's role in the price-fixing conspiracy and took no action to ensure that the 
Company's best interests were being protected. Furthermore, even afier it had become 
indisputably clear that Micron was, in fact, involved in the conspiracy, defendants failed to seek 
redress for the substantial harm suffered by the Company or to remove the wrongdoers &om their 
positions with the Company. As a result of these breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority of the 
directors on the Board at the time this action was originally commenced (among others), plaintiff 
was excused from malung any demand on the Board prior to filing his initial complaint. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
On March 6, 2006, plaintiff commenced this shareholder derivative action on behalf of 
~ icron . '  Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 24, 2006 (the "FAC") for breach of 
fiduciary duty, abuse of control, gross mismanagement, waste of corporate assets and unjust 
enrichment. Plaintiff alleged that demand on Micron's Board was htile and, therefore, excused. 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the FAC, arguing, among other things, that plaintiff had 
On February 24,2006, a federal securities class action based on substantially similar facts was 
filed against Micron and certain of its executive officers in the United States District Court for 
the District of Idaho. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss on February 21,2007, 
finding that the plaintiffs had adequately pled their claims even under the heightened pleading 
standards applicable to that case. 
failed to adequately plead that demand on Micron's Board was excused. Plaintiff presented a 
strong case for demand futility, and, after full briefing on the issue, the district court went "back 
and forth" about whether to grant or deny the motion to dismiss. See, e.g., May 10,2007 TR. p. 2, 
L. 23 - p. 3, L. 1 ("I can tell you at this point, I've kind of looked at dismissing it, and I've looked 
at not dismissing it, and kind of gone back and forth on it. And, right now, I'm right down the 
middle."). Ultimately, the district court conditionally granted the motion to dismiss without 
prejudice, finding that the facts as pled in the FAC were insufficient to show that a majority of 
Micron's Board "should have been aware of the problems or that they should have acted to stop 
further damage to the corporation sooner" and, thus, that plaintiff had adequately pled demand 
futility. R. Vol. 11, p. 224. The district court granted plaintiff leave to amend the complaint "so as 
to add the additional facts which they argue support the demand futility." R. Vol. TI, p. 226. 
On June 29, 2007, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint that contained additional 
facts supporting a finding of demand futility. Then, on September 6, 2007, before defendants 
responded to the second amended complaint, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint (the 
"TAC") to include further information impugning the Board's independence that only surfaced 
after the second amended complaint was filed. The TAC, which is the complaint at issue in this 
appeal, alleged that demand on Micron's Board was futile because, inter alia: (i) five of the nine 
members of the Board face a sufficiently substantial likelihood of liability based on their 
conscious disregard of red flags that would have put them on notice of Micron's involvement in 
the DRAM price-fixing conspiracy and corresponding failure to take any action in connection 
therewith; and (ii) five of the nine members of the Board face a sufficiently substantial likelihood 
of liability for their failure to seek redress of any kind or to remove the wrongdoers from their 
positions at the Company once it had become clear that Micron was involved in the DRAM price- 
fixing conspiracy (which defendants and the district court agree was the case by at least 2002). 
Defendants moved to dismiss the TAC on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to adequately plead 
demand futility and that plaintiff had failed to adequately state a claim. After full briefing on the 
motions to dismiss, the district court granted the motion to dismiss for failure to make a demand 
with prejudice and without leave to amend on the ground that plaintiff had failed to adequately 
plead demand ktility. Plaintiff appeals from that order of the district court dismissing the case 
with prejudice. 
C. Statement of the Pacts 
1. Defendants Consciously Disregard Red Flags, Tl~ereby Permitting 
Micron's Involvement in the Conspiracy to Fix the Price of DRAM 
Micron manufactures and markets semiconductor devices worldwide and its products 
include a series of DRAM products, which provide data storage and retrieval. R. Vol. 11, p. 287, 
75, p. 293, 722. Sales of DRAM represented 95% of Micron's revenues and, therefore, had an 
enormous impact on the Company's success. R. Vol. 11, p. 289,111, p. 322,7107(a). In fact, from 
April 2000 until December 2002, the spot price of DRAM virtually mirrored the price of Micron 
common stock. R. Vol. 11, p. 289,711. 
In the mid-to-late 1990s, Rambus, Inc. ("Rambus") charged Micron and other DRAM 
manufacturers royalties to incorporate crucial technology, RDRAM, into their respective 
computer memory chips. R. Vol. 11, pp. 288-89, 777-10, p. 302, m47-48. Micron claimed that 
these royalty payments severely cut into their profits and, in retaliation, accused Rambus of 
illegally obtaining the intellectual "rights" to that technology, arguing that those intellectual rights 
were improperly derived from Rambus' earlier involvement in an industry standards-setting group. 
Id. The major DRAM manufacturers also began to understand that, absent a concerted effort to the 
contrary, RDRAM would become the leading DRAM technology. Id. 
Beginning in 2000, news sources were hinting at the existence of price-fixing activities 
among the leading DRAM manufacturers and, as early as 2001, one manufacturer publicly 
indicated that an agreement had been reached between the major DRAM manufacturers to cut 
production of DRAM in order to raise prices. R. Vol. 11, p. 306,762, p. 307,767, p. 308,769, p. 
309,772. 
By October 2001, the price of DRAM dropped below $1 for 128 Mb of DRAM, and the 
major DRAM manufacturers were arranging meetings about how to deal with the rapidly 
declining DRAM prices. R. Vol. 11, p. 307. Defendant Michael Sadler ("Sadler"), Micron's Vice 
President of Worldwide Sales, participated in numerous meetings with the Chief Executive 
Officers ("CEOs") and other officers of other DRAM manufacturers to determine whether they 
would be cutting DRAM production. R. Vol. 11, p. 295,725, p. 307, 765. Defendant Appleton, 
the Company's CEO, President and Chairman, met regularly with Sadler, was aware of and 
authorized defendant Sadler's meetings, and received reports concerning the meetings. R. Vol. 11, 
p. 307,7766. In fact, in testimony concerning DRAM price-fixing at the trial of Gary Swanson 
(Vice President of Sales at Hynix, another DRAM manufacturer), Sadler has testified that 
Appleton, the Chairman of Micron's Board, knew of these meetings. See Affidavit of Marc M. 
Umeda in Support of Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Appellant's Brief ("Umeda Aff."), 
Ex. B at pp. 1203-06, 1256, 1264-65. During and after these meetings, between September 2001 
and March 2002, Micron cut its supply of DRAM by 20% and DRAM prices shot up to $4.50 
each in the first quarter of 2002 from an average of $1.97 each in the fourth quarter of 2001. R. 
Vol. 11, p. 3 10,778 1-82. 
2. Even in the Face of an Investigation by the Department of Justice, 
Defendants Deny that Micron Officers Were Involved and Fail to 
Take Action to Hold the Wrongdoers Responsible or to Protect the 
Company from Further Harm 
In June 2002, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued a federal grand jury subpoena to 
Micron. R. Vol. 11, p. 289, 1713-14, pp. 309-1 1,1176-85. In addition to the announcement of the 
DOJ investigation, a series of news articles was published discussing the DRAM problems and 
Micron's involvement in the conspiracy, including articles in the Idaho Statesman, the New Yovk 
Times and the Wall Street Journal. R. Vol. 11, p. 289,714, pp. 309-311, 7777-85. The parties and 
the district court have all conceded that the defendants were aware, at least as of June 2002, that 
Micron was involved in the DRAM price-fixing conspiracy. R. Vol. 11, p. 290,115, p. 31 1,7786- 
87; R. Vol. 11, p. 408. 
Nonetheless, defendants stood by idly while their fellow defendants and other Micron 
representatives steadfastly denied their involvement in the DRAM price-fixing scheme, 
culminating in defendant Appleton's November 2004 statement that it was "not possible to control 
prices in this industry" and that the DOJ's investigation was merely "theoretical." R. Vol. 11, p. 
290, 115, pp. 314-15, 7794-95. A mere eight days after that statement, Micron disclosed that it 
had entered into a secret amnesty agreement with the DOJ to avoid prosecution in the 
government's price-fixing investigation. R. Vol. 11, p. 291,117, pp. 3 15-1 6,7795-96. This type of 
agreement is offered to a company that voluntarily reports illegal antitrust activities before an 
investigation has begun or is the first company to come forward when an illegal activity is first 
reported. Id. With this disclosure, defendant Appleton was forced to retract his earlier public 
statements, admitting that "neither [was] the case." Id. Defendant Appleton fiuther conceded that 
the "DOJ's investigation revealed evidence of price fixing by Micron employees and its 
competitors on DRAM sold to certain computer and server manufacturers." Id. 
Plaintiff has conducted a detailed examination of defendants' response to the price-fixing 
revelations and, to date, it does not appear defendants have taken any action to determine the 
extent of Micron representatives' involvement in the conspiracy or to protect the Company from 
M e r  harm. R. Vol. 11, p. 290,715, p. 31 1,7786-87. There was no special committee created, 
no investigation, no fact-finding process and no interviews with management, directors or 
employees. Id. Had the defendants, especially the members of the Board, acted to investigate 
the role of Micron representatives and taken action against the wrongdoers sooner, the Company 
would not have to bear the full brunt of the consequences of the wrongdoing. This inaction is a 
breach of the defendants' fiduciary duties to Micron and renders any demand on the Board futile. 
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the district court erred in holding that plaintiff failed to adequately plead demand 
futility where, taking all facts together, plaintiff alleged, among other things: 
A. that a majority of the members of the Board failed to act despite being on 
notice of price-fixing a s  a result of, among other things, the following: (i) 
the CEO, president and chairman of the Board participated in andlor knew 
of the price-fixing; (ii) the product at issue represented 95% of the 
Company's revenue and was vital to the Company's success; (iii) there 
were substantial price fluctuations with the Company's product; and (iv) 
multiple news articles had suggested the existence of price-fixing in the 
industry; 
B. that the Company ended its investigation without explanation, failed to 
seek to recover kom the wrongdoers and permitted the wrongdoers to 
maintain their positions at the Company despite the fact that: (i) there is 
admitted wrongdoing; (ii) various theories exist on which to recover from 
the wrongdoers; and (iii) the Company has suffered and continues to 
suffer enormous monetary damages as a result of the wrongdoing; and 
C. that a majority of the members of the Board had knowledge of facts 
indicating potential wrongdoing and took no action until it was confronted 
with a subpoena from the DOJ. 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
The demand requirement, which is the issue of this appeal, is governed by the law of the 
state of incorporation. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Sews., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108-09 (1991). See 
also R. Vol. 11, p. 422, Ex. 11 at p. 11 n.6; R. Vol. 11, p. 406. This is because the decision by a 
board of directors whether or not to bring suit against the corporation's officers and directors is a 
matter of the "internal affairs" of the corporation. The internal affairs doctrine "governs the 
choice of law determinations involving matters peculiar to corporations, that is, those activities 
concerning the relationships inter se of the corporation, its directors, officers and shareholders." 
McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 215 (Del. 1987). The doctrine states that the 
management of the internal affairs of a corporation will be subject to the law of the state of 
incorporation. Id. Here, the demand issue unavoidably touches upon the relationships "inter se of 
the corporation, its directors, officers and shareholders." Id. 
In light of the above, as well as the fact that plaintiff is aware of no Idaho appellate 
decision outlining the standard of review for the question of demand futility involving a Delaware 
corporation, the law of Delaware (the state in which Micron is incorporated) provides the 
applicable standard of review in this case. Under Delaware law, a de novo review is the 
appropriate standard for a motion to dismiss based on demand fbtility. In the landmark case of 
Brehm v. Eisnev, the Supreme Court of Delaware overruled previous decisions where the 
deferential abuse of discretion standard was applied when reviewing a motion to dismiss based on 
demand futility. 746 A.2d 244, 253 (Del. 2000). The Supreme Court of Delaware's ruling in 
Bvehm "is designed to make clear that our review of decisions of the Court of Chancery applying 
Rule 23.1 is de novo and plenary." Id. at 253. "Analyzing a pleading for legal sufficiency is not, 
for example, the equivalent of the deferential review of certain discretionary rulings." Id. at 253- 
54. 
Accordingly, de novo review is the appropriate standard for this Court's review, and no 
deference should be given to the district court's conclusions or holding. 
B. The District Court Erred in Finding that Plaintiff Had Failed to Adequately 
Allege that Demand on Micron's Board Was Futile 
1. Legal Standards Applicable to the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Make a Demand 
As discussed above, because Micron is a Delaware corporation, Delaware law applies to 
the demand fbtility analysis. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 108-09. Under Delaware law, it is well settled 
that demand need not be alleged if the facts pled show that such a demand would have been 
futile. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 807 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm, 
746 A.2d 244. Where there is an action or conscious inaction by a board of directors, demand is 
futile where, under the particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt2 is created that: (i) a 
majority of the directors are disinterested and independent, or (ii) the challenged transaction was 
otherwise the product of valid business judgment. Id. at 8 13. Where the subject of the derivative 
action is not a business decision of the board, the court must determine whether or not the 
particularized factual allegations of a derivative stockholder complaint create a reasonable doubt 
that the board could have properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment 
in responding to a demand. Rules v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927,934 (Del. 1993). 
On a motion to dismiss, the court should look only at the pleadings, and all inferences 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Young v. City ofKetchum, 
A reasonable doubt is not a difficult burden for plaintiff to meet. A reasonable doubt is defined 
as "a doubt based upon reason and common sense ... [which] intelligent, reasonable and impartial 
people may honestly entertain ...." Mills v. State, 732 A.2d 845, 851 (Del. 1999). 
137 Idaho 102, 104 (2002); Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). 
"[Tlhe question is whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim 
which, if true, would entitle him to relief." Rincover v. State, Dep't of Fin., Sec. Bureau, 128 
Idaho 653, 656 (1 996); Sen. Employees Int'l Union 6 v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 106 
Idaho 756, 758 (1984); Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6. "[Elvery reasonable intendment will be 
made to sustain a complaint against a motion to dismiss . . . ." Idaho Comm'n on Human Rights v. 
Campbell, 95 Idaho 215, 217 (1973). "'The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately 
prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims."' Young, 137 
Idaho at 104 (citations omitted). Further, in assessing demand under Delaware law, all 
reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintif$ In re Cendant 
Corp. Derivative Action Litig., 189 F.R.D. 117, 127 (D.N.J. 1999). Finally, a plaintiff is not 
required to plead evidence, nor is proof of success on the merits required. Brehm, 746 A.2d 
244. 
At the time this action was commenced, Micron's Board was comprised of nine directors. 
Accordingly, demand is futile if there is a reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness or 
independence offive directors. See Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80,8S-86 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
2. There Is a Reasonable Doubt as to the Disinterestedness of a Majority 
of the Board, Rendering Demand Futile 
a. Defendants Appleton, Bagley, Lothrop, Smith and VVeber Face 
a Sufficiently Substantial Likelihood of Liability for 
Consciously Disregarding Red Flags and Thereby Permitting 
Micron's Involvement in the Conspiracy to Fix the Price of 
DRAM 
There is a reasonable doubt that directors are disinterested, and thus demand is futile, 
where the directors "face a sufficiently substantial threat of personal liability to compromise their 
ability to act impartially on a demand." Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 503 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
(emphasis added). See also Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1355 (Del. Ch. 1995) (court 
analyzed question of whether directors' threat of personal liability was "substantial enough" to 
render them interested) (emphasis added).3 Directors face a sufficiently substantial threat of 
personal liability where a plaintiff alleges facts demonstrating that the directors were actually 
aware of known violations, yet took no steps toprevent or remedy the situation. See In re Abbott 
Labs. Derivative Sfholders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 806 (7th Cir. 2003). Here, numerous factual 
allegations create the requisite reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness of defendants 
Appleton, Bagley, Lothrop, Smith and Weber (a majority of the Board) because they consciously 
ignored red flags that would otherwise have made them aware of Micron's involvement in the 
price-fixing conspiracy. 
First, sales of DRAM represented 95% of Micron's revenues and, therefore, had an 
enormous impact on the Company's success. R. Vol. 11, p. 289,jil I, p. 322,ji107(a). From April 
2000 until December 2002, the spot price of DRAM virtually mirrored the price of Micron 
common stock. Id. '"I]n cases in which a company's primary product or service is in jeopardy, 
courts have been willing to impute that knowledge to the company's officers and directors." In re 
Biopure Corp. Derivative Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 305, 308 (D. Mass. 2006). See also In re 
Vicuron Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 04-2627,2005 WL 2989674, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 1,2005) 
(the importance to the company of the lead drug under development warranted an inference of 
recklessness, at the least, of its officers and directors); In re Ramp Networks, Inc. Sec., 201 F. 
Supp. 2d 1051, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("generally, where major transactions or core information 
A "substantial likelihood" of liability is sufficient, but not necessary, to establish demand 
htility, as it gives rise to a reasonable doubt that the director is "able to act free of personal 
financial interest and improper extraneous influences" in "carrying out [the] tasks" of responding 
to a demand letter. See Rules, 634 A.2d at 935. 
is at issue, an inference arises that top officers of a company were aware of the transaction or 
information") (citations omitted). In Biopure, the United States District Court imputed knowledge 
of negative information about the company's principal product to its directors and officers, stating 
that "[alrgument over whether the particular officer and director defendants in this case were 
sufficiently 'inside' to be deemed to have had knowledge is factual, and can be made at a later 
stage of this litigation." 424 F. Supp. 2d at 308. In the district court briefing, defendants relied on 
In re Forest Laboratories, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 450 F .  Supp. 2d 379, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), 
in arguing that the director defendants did not have knowledge of or consciously ignore Micron's 
role in the price-fixing conspiracy notwithstanding the significance of DRAM to the Company's 
success. See, e.g., R. Vol. 11, p. 393. Forest Labs. is distinguishable on its facts. In Forest Labs., 
the plaintiffs brought a derivative action alleging that the defendants sold stock while misleading 
shareholders as to the future prospects of its key products, the antidepressants Celexa and 
Lexapro. The court refused to attribute knowledge of the true facts concerning Celexa and 
Lexapro to the outside directors who were "not alleged to be directly involved in the day-to-day 
operations of the company." Forest Labs., 450 F .  Supp. 2d at 391. The court so held, and 
distinguished that case from Biopure, because there were no allegations that the facts at issue 
concerning Celexa and Lexapro had or would have "catastrophic consequences for Forest's 
primary sources of revenue or put the 'company's primary product ... in jeopardy!" Id. at 393 
(quoting Biopure, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 308). In contrast, plaintiff here has alleged that the growing 
popularity of RDRAM, the royalties demanded by Rambus for the use of RDRAM technology 
and the dramatically declining prices in the DRAM market were threatening Micron's business. 
See, e.g., R. Vol. 11, pp. 302-05, 7747-61, p. 322, 7107(a). Accordingly, in light of the 
significance of DRAM to Micron's success and the fact that Micron's future success in the DRAM 
market was in jeopardy, it is reasonable to infer that the Board was thus aware of at least major 
developments in the strategy, pricing and sales of DRAM chips, including Micron's 
communications with other major DRAM manufacturers. Indeed, defendants themselves concede 
that the directors "would be aware of the relationship between DRAM pricing, and the price of 
Micron common stock." May 10, 2007 TR. p. 34, L. 3-4. The district court thus erred in finding 
that "the argument that DRAM was significant to Micron's success" was insufficient to attribute 
knowledge of Micron's role in the price-fixing to the director defendants. See R. Vol. 11, p. 408. 
Further, by 2000, news sources from CNN to many periodicals relevant to the DRAM 
industry had begun to hint at price-fixing activities among the leading DRAM manufacturers. R. 
Vol. 11, p. 306, 762, p. 307,767, p. 308,769, p. 309,772. These news sources included: (i) a 2000 
article in CNNMoney which noted that "[m]anufacturers have, not surprisingly, dragged their feet 
in RDRAM production, keeping the prices high and uptake slow" (R. Vol. 11, p. 306,762); (ii) a 
2001 article in the Silicon Strategies which reported that a number of DRAM manufacturers met 
to discuss measures that could be taken to halt "the downward spiral of DRAM prices" (R. Vol. 11, 
p. 307 767); (iii) a 2001 article in Electronics Supply & Manufacturing which described the 
DRAM price increase as a "puzzling turnaround" that "sent analysts and participants scrambling 
for an explanation" (R. Vol. 11, p. 308, 769); (iv) a 2001 article in Electronics Buyer News which 
stated that the price increase left "everyone from suppliers to analysts perplexed" (id.); and (v) 
2002 articles in The Detroit News and The Taipei Times which reported that Mosel Vitelic, 
Taiwan's third-largest memory chip maker, had agreed with other manufacturers to restrict spot 
market sales to boost chip prices, agreeing to "try not to sell below $3" (R. Vol. 11, p. 309, 772). 
Defendants themselves admit that newspapers articles can serve as red flags sufficient to put 
directors on notice of potential wrongdoing. See May 10, 2007 TR. p. 83, L. 11-13. ("Of course 
[newspaper articles] can mean something. We're not saying that newspaper articles can't be red 
flags."). Moreover, as early as 2001, a DRAM manufacturer indicated that an agreement had been 
reached between DRAM manufacturers to cut production of DRAM in order to raise prices. R. 
Vol. 11, p. 309,772. Accordingly, by at least 2000, defendants should have been investigating the 
participation of Micron and its representatives in the DRAM price-fixing conspiracy, and halting 
the participation if the investigation revealed any wrong doing (which it would have here). Yet, 
despite this duty, defendants did nothing. R. Vol. 11, p. 31 1, 7786-87. This was a clear breach of 
their fiduciary duty of good faith for which they face a sufficiently substantial threat of liability, 
rendering demand futile. See Abbott Labs., 325 F.3d at 806 (directors face a sufficiently 
substantial threat of personal liability where a plaintiff alleges facts demonstrating that the 
directors were actually aware of known violations, yet took no steps to prevent or remedy the 
situation); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (it is a failure to act in 
good faith when a director consciously disregards a known duty); Stone ex. rel. AmSouth 
Bancoiporation v. Ritter, 91 1 A.2d 362, 367 (Del. 2006) (under Delaware law, a failure to act in 
good faith may be shown where the fiduciary intentionallj fails to act in the face of a known 
duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties) (quoting Walt Disney, 906 A.2d 
27). The district court found that the plethora of news articles suggesting the existence of price- 
fixing and Micron's role therein were insufficient to show knowledge (or conscious ignorance) on 
the part of the directors because the articles "did not specifically cite Micron" and were not "in 
major publications that the Court should presume the directors had read." R. Vol. 11, p. 408. 
Plaintiff is aware of no authority requiring that red flags specifically name the company, or that 
red flags may only be found in "major publications." In any event, CNN Money is certainly a 
"major publication," and the other news articles were published in industry magazines that, while 
perhaps not major publications for the general public, would not have escaped the attention of a 
conscientious Board member. Furthermore, the fact that the articles did not specifically mention 
Micron is of no consequence. The articles repeatedly refer to potential price-fixing among the 
DRAM manufacturers, and there is no dispute that Micron was one of the major DRAM 
manufacturers throughout the entire Relevant Period. 
Between October 1, 2001 and October 9, 2001, as prices of DRAM dipped below $1 for 
128 Mb of DRAM, defendant Sadler traveled to Munich, Tokyo, Taiwan and Seoul to meet with 
the CEOs of other DRAM manufacturers to determine whether some of the other DRAM 
manufacturers would be cutting DRAM production. R. Vol. 11, p. 295, 125, p. 307, 165. 
Defendant Sadler also traveled back to Munich later in October 2001 to meet with Infineon 
Technologies' ("Infineon") Chief Operating Officer ("COO"), who left the meeting convinced that 
Micron was willing to restrict the supply of DRAM. R. Vol. 11, p. 307,165. Defendant Sadler 
had the ultimate pricing authority for DRAM for all Micron customers. Umeda Aff., Ex. A at p. 
1063. Defendant Appleton, Micron's CEO, President and Chairman, met regularly with defendant 
Sadler regarding Micron's strategic objectives and, in fact, discussed pricing with defendant 
Appleton once a week. Umeda Aff., Ex. B. pp. 1203-06. Accordingly, defendant Appleton knew 
that Sadler was in contact with the other DRAM manufacturers and authorized Sadler's trips to 
engage in such discussions. Id. at pp. 1205, 1256. Defendant Appleton even received interim 
reports from Sadler while Sadler was out of the country meeting with Micron's competitors about 
DRAM prices. Id. at p. 1264. Further, Sadler testified to the United States government that his 
"comments to Mr. Appleton should have allowed him to draw the conclusion that [Sadler] had 
price information from competitors." Id. at p. 1205 L. 21-23. Defendant Appleton even planned 
to fly to Munich himself to meet secretly with Infineon and the Samsung Electronics ("Samsung") 
CEO about cutting back DRAM production. R. Vol. 11, p. 307,166. Given defendant Appleton's 
participation in (or, at a minimum, knowledge of) the conspiracy to fix DRAM prices, along with 
the significance of DRAM to Micron's business, Appleton clearly faces a sufficiently substantial 
likelihood of liability, rendering demand on him f ~ t i l e . ~  Further, whether or not Appleton shared 
specific details of the ongoing conspiracy with the rest of the Board, it is reasonable to infer that, 
assuming proper governance procedures, Appleton shared information regarding the 
developments in DRAM pricing and strategy with fellow directors Bagley, Lothrop, Smith and 
Weber at various meetings of the Board and its committees. R. Vol. 11, pp. 293-97,7723-31, p. 
323,7107(b). See also Abbott, 325 F.3d at 806 ("Under proper corporate governance procedures 
. . . information of the violations would have been shared at the board meetings."); Cendant, 189 
F.R.D. at 127 (all reasonabIe inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). 
In light of all of the red flags detailed herein, including discussions among Sadler, Appleton and 
competing DRAM manufacturers concerning DRAM pricing, the members of the Board had a 
duty to investigate potential wrongdoing, ask questions and take action as necessary to protect the 
Company's interests. Nonetheless, defendants Appleton, Bagley, Lothrop, Smith and Weber took 
no action in breach of their fiduciary duties. 
Finally, Micron was among the most active in decreasing its supply of DRAM, cutting it 
by 20% between September 2001 and March 2002 and, therefore, Micron was among the most 
likely to "take a hit" as a result of the DOJ investigation. 781. In the first quarter of 2002, DRAM 
prices also "shot up to $4.50 each in [the first quarter of 20021 from an average of $1.97 each in 
the fourth quarter of last year." 782. In light of the significance of DRAM to Micron's success, a 
20% cut in DRAM supply and coinciding increase in DRAM prices of more than 100% would not 
have gone unnoticed if the Board was not consciously ignoring what was right in front of its 
face-a widespread price-fixing conspiracy among the DRAM manufacturers, including Micron. 
The district court agreed with this position, as it found demand on Appleton futile. See R. Vol. 
11, p. 408. 
The district court found that "the presumption that the directors knew of the price fluctuation is 
insufficient to impute knowledge of criminal activity to the directors." R. Vol. 11, p. 408. This 
misses the point. Plaintiff does not allege that the significance of DRAM to Micron's future, the 
fact that the Company's future in the DRAM market faced serious risks throughout the Relevant 
Period, the news articles suggesting the existence of price-fixing and the abnormal DRAM supply 
and price fluctuations necessarily put the Board on notice of the "criminal activity." These red 
flags, however, taken cumulatively, did trigger a fiduciary duty to investigate any potential 
wrongdoing and take action as necessary to halt any actual wrongdoing and protect Micron from 
further harm.' 
In light of these facts, it is reasonable to infer that the Board knew of, or consciously 
ignored, the potential involvement of Micron representatives in the conspiracy to fix the price of 
DRAM. Defendants had a duty to take action to halt the participation of Micron and its 
representatives in the DRAM price-fixing conspiracy, but failed to do so in breach of their 
fiduciary duties. Accordingly, the district court erred in finding that plaintiff had failed to 
adequately plead demand futility based on the Board's conscious disregard of numerous and 
obvious red flags and corresponding failure to act in the best interests of Micron. 
In addition to taking no action to halt the illegal activity in the face of numerous and obvious red 
flags, defendants continued to allow the Company's representatives to deny any involvement in 
the conspiracy and downplay the severity of the situation. R. Vol. 11, p. 312, 7788-90, p. 314, 
7192-94. It was not until November 2004, after Infineon, another leading DRAM manufacturer, 
admitted to engaging in price-fixing and Micron had reached an agreement with the DOJ which 
provided amnesty to the Company in connection with the DRAM price-fixing conspiracy, that the 
Company admitted that it had participated in the price-fixing. R. Vol. 11, p. 315,85, p. 3 16,796. 
b. Defendants Appleton, Bagley, Lothrop, Smith and Weber Face 
a Sufficiently Substantial Threat of Liability for Failing to 
Seek Redress from Any of the Wrongdoers or Protect the 
Company from Additional Harm After Micron Admitted 
Involvement in the Price-Fixing Conspiracy, Further 
Rendering Demand Futile 
As noted above, it is a breach of the duty of good faith, and therefore demand is futile, 
when a director consciously fails to act in the face of a known duty to act. See, e.g., Walt Disney, 
906 A.2d at 27 (it is a failure to act in good faith when a director consciously disregards a known 
duty); Stone, 91 1 A.2d at 369 (under Delaware law, a "failure to act in good faith may be shown 
. . . where the fiduciary . . . intentionally fails to act in the face of a known du@ to act, 
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties") (emphasis added) (citing Whlt Disney, 906 
A.2d at 67). Nonetheless, the district court rejected plaintiffs demand futility allegations based on 
the Board's utter failure to act in the face of known violations that have caused and continue to 
cause substantial damage to Micron. Specifically, the district court found that the members of the 
Board could and did satisfy their fiduciary duties in connection with the massive DRAM price- 
fixing conspiracy merely by cooperating with the DOJ investigation and entering into an amnesty 
agreement in order to avoid liability. R. Vol. 11, p. 409. However, under the circumstances of this 
case-a vast conspiracy to fix DRAM prices in which the Company was admittedly involved and 
massive damages that have been suffered by the Companyiiefendants' fiduciary duties require 
more than mere cooperation with the DOJ upon receiving a subpoena. For the reasons discussed 
below, the district court holding was in error. 
There is no doubt that defendants were on notice of the involvement of Micron employees 
in the price-fixing conspiracy by at least June 2002, when the DOJ issued a federal grand jury 
subpoena to Micron that demanded any documents relating to contacts and communications 
between DRAM manufacturers regarding any discussions relating to pricing and sales of DRAM 
chips. R. Vol. 11, p. 289,113, p. 309,176. The district court acknowledged as much, stating that 
"[clertainly at this point the Board would have known of the problems." R. Vol. 11, pp. 223-24. 
Plaintiff conducted his own investigation into any possible action taken by the Board and 
was unable to find anything-no Board investigation, no committee charged with conducting an 
investigation, no interviews with Micron employees or other representatives. Defendants 
presumably would have brought any other actions taken on behalf of Micron to the district court's 
attention, and the fact that they did not do so provides substantial support for plaintiffs 
allegations. This inaction does not reflect a Board truly concerned with the best interests of the 
Company, but rather a Board looking to protect its own members and CEO. Rather, in an effort to 
avoid liability for their breaches of fiduciary duty and violations of law, defendants remained 
silent while Micron representatives, led by defendant Appleton, denied their involvement in the 
DRAM price-fixing scheme for over two years. R. Vol. 11, p. 290,115, pp. 314-15,1194-95. 
Defendants' failure to investigate the wrongdoing andYtake action against any of the 
culpable parties, including themselves, has allowed further damage to be suffered by Micron and 
precluded any recovery which may have helped to minimize the harm suffered by the Company. 
Because of the Board's failure to do so, the Company has been forced to bear all of the costs 
associated with litigation stemming from the involvement of its representatives in the conspiracy 
to fix DRAM prices, including: (i) money expended investigating, defending and settling the 
numerous public and private actions brought against it; (ii) the $91 million the Company agreed to 
pay on January 9, 2007 in connection with the Direct Purchaser Settlement; and (iii) significant 
potential liability stemming from the final resolution of violations of antitrust laws. R. Vol. 11, pp. 
292,120, p. 300,140. Had defendants actively and thoroughly investigated the wrongdoing with 
an eye toward the best interests of Micron, and sought redress from the individuals who have put 
the Company in this precarious position, defendants could have prevented fkrther damage to the 
Company. Their utter failure to do so is a breach of their fiduciary duties and renders any demand 
upon them futile. 
Conrad v. Blank, 940 A.2d 28 (Del. Ch. 2007), provides significant guidance on the 
question of demand futility in the context of a board's failure to act to protect the corporation's 
interests and prevent further damage to the corporation in the face of known wrongdoing. In 
Conrad, the Delaware Chancery Court noted that where various theories existed on which to 
recover from the corporation's officers and directors, there was substantial evidence of 
wrongdoing and the company ended its "investigation" without explanation and apparently 
without seeking redress of any kind, "it would be odd if Delaware law required a stockholder to 
make demand on the board of directors before suing on those very same theories of recovery." Id. 
at 38. 
Although the court in Conrad found demand to be futile on other grounds and did not rest 
its holding on a failure to adequately investigate the wrongdoing or seek redress, the court's 
opinion demonstrates that actions (or inaction) like that displayed in this case may be sufficient 
to render demand futile under Delaware law. Here, like in Conrad, there is substantial factual 
support for plaintiffs allegations of wrongdoing. For example, defendant Appleton participated 
in weekly meetings with Sadler to discuss DRAM pricing, knew about and authorized Sadler's 
discussions with other DRAM manufacturers, knew that Sadler was receiving price information 
&om competitors and pianned to fly to Munich himself to meet secretly with other CEOs about 
cutting back DRAM production. R. Vol. 11, p. 307, 766; Umeda Aff., Ex. B. at pp. 1203-06, 
1256, 1264. Similarly, defendant Sadler, who had the ultimate pricing authority for DRAM for 
all Micron customers, met repeatedly with other DRAM manufacturers as part of a conspiracy to 
fix prices. R. Vol. 11, p. 295, 725, p. 307,765; Umeda AfY., Ex. A at p. 1063. Finally, Micron 
has even admitted that there was evidence of price-fixing by Company employees. R. Vol. 11, 
pp. 315-16,1jn95-96. There is no doubt that there is strong evidence of wrongdoing in this case 
and that various theories exist on which to hold liable and seek monetary recovery Erom the 
Individual Defendants. 
Moreover, despite plaintiffs own investigation into anything done by the Board in 
response to the wrongdoing, plaintiff found no special committee created, no investigation, no 
fact-finding process and no interviews with management, directors or employees. Defendants' 
"actions" appear to have consisted merely of cooperating with the DOJ to avoid liability, without 
any efforts by the Board to seek redress of any kind from the wrongdoers responsible for causing 
such harm to Micron. R. Vol. 11, p. 290, 715, p. 31 1, m86-87, p. 323, 7107(c). At the same 
time, defendants Appleton, Bagley, Lothrop, Smith and Weber passively allowed Micron 
representatives, including defendant Appleton himself, to repeatedly cover up their wrongdoing. 
R. Vol. 11, pp. 312-15, 1788-95. Despite defendant Appleton's knowledge of the price-fixing 
conspiracy and unwarranted and repeated denials of such conspiracy, the Board has still not 
taken any action seeking redress from defendant Appleton or defendant Sadler or asked them to 
step down, and both defendants remain employed by the Company. On the contrary, the only 
individual who eventually spoke out against Appleton is no longer with the In light 
Defendant Smith, one of Micron's long-standing Board members, made statements to the Idaho 
Statesman suggesting the rest of the Board was not independent of defendant Appleton which 
helps explain the Board's conscious inaction. Defendant Smith stated that a change at the top 
should have been made a long time ago, but that the rest of the Board was not prepared to make 
the necessary change. R. Vol. 11, p. 319, 7101, p. 324,1107(d). Defendant Smith further stated 
that Micron needed new management and perhaps a completely new Board. Defendant Smith 
also said that the Board as a whole was "very passive," and not "well-informed" during the 
Relevant Period, and that the damage caused to Micron due to faulty management could have 
been stopped if the Board would have been more "aggressive" and "inquiring." Id. These facts 
provide further support to plaintiffs position that the Board, even with knowledge of the existence 
of liability-creating activity and Micron's role in such conspiracy, consciously refused to take any 
of these facts, as in Conrad, "it would be odd" if the Court required plaintiff "to make demand on 
the board of directors before suing on those very same theories of recovery." Conrad, 940 A.2d 
at 38. 
In light of their failure to act in the Company's best interests after learning of its 
involvement in the conspiracy to fix DRAM prices, defendants Appleton, Bagley, Lothrop, Smith 
and Weber have exposed Micron to significant damages and face a sufficiently substantial threat 
of liability that creates a reasonable doubt as to their disinterestedness in considering a demand. 
Further, the Board's conscious decision not to act to stop further damage to Micron or seek redress 
on behalf of the Company was not a valid exercise of business judgment. Any demand on 
defendants Appleton, Bagley, Lothrop, Smith and Weber would, therefore, have been futile, and it 
was error for the district court to dismiss the action for failure to plead demand futility based 
solely on the Board's cooperation with the DOJ. 
c. Defendants Appleton, Bagley, Lothrop, Smith and Weber Face 
a Sufficiently Substantial Likelihood of Liability for 
ConsciousIy Failing to Monitor or Oversee Micron's 
Operations 
Defendants previously argued that plaintiff was alleging a "Caremark" claim based on a 
lack of oversight. R. Vol. 11, p. 421, Ex. 1 at 10-14. As demonstrated herein, however, plaintiff 
has alleged more than a mere "failure to exercise their oversight function." In re Caremark Int'l 
Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). Nonetheless, defendants face a 
sufficiently substantial threat of liability under Careinark as well, further rendering demand 
futile. 
action to become fully informed or bring action against their fellow defendants-especially 
defendant Appleton. 
Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for director oversight liability: (1) 
the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (2) 
having implemented such a system of controls, the directors consciously failed to monitor or 
oversee its operations, thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems 
requiring their attention. Stone, 91 1 A.2d at 370. Here, Micron has implemented an adequate 
system of controls. See, e.g., R. Vol. 11, p. 326, 7107(g) ("The Audit Committee is responsible 
by its charter for: (i) reviewing at least quarterly the Company's system of internal controls; and 
(ii) reviewing periodically, with the Company's General Counsel, the Company's compliance 
with legal and regulatory requirements."). Thus, the issue is whether defendants "consciously 
failed to monitor or oversee its operations, thus disabling themselves from being informed of 
risks or problems requiring their attention." Stone, 91 1 A.2d at 370. 
Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000), provides 
guidance on this issue. In Ash, the court stated that the plaintiffs alleged only four minor "red 
flags": (1) a news article in Bloomberg; (2) a report by the Center for Financial Research and 
Analysis ("CFRA"), which it distributed only to its clients; (3) a second CFRA report which was 
published; and (4) news of the resignation of the company's CEOICFOlPresident. Furtber, the 
plaintiffs in Ash alleged that the defendants only failed to detect the wrongdoing for a mere 3% 
months. In contrast, as demonstrated above, plaintiff here has alleged a much stronger case of 
red flags, particularly in light of the fact that the declining price of DRAM was jeopardizing 
Micron's future business prospects and, thus, the red flags would have come to the attention of 
the Board. Moreover, the red flags in the instant action were being waved in the collective faces 
of the members of Micron's Board for a longer period of time-more than one-and-a-half years 
from the CNN Money article that hinted at anti-competitive activities among the DRAM 
manufacturers; nearly ten months from the Silicon Strategies article reporting that a number of 
DRAM manufacturers had met to discuss how to halt "the downward spiral of DRAM prices"; 
and nearly eight months from the Electronics Supply & Manufacturing and Electronics Buyer 
News articles amidst skyrocketing DRAM prices. R. Vol. 11, p. 306, m62, 67, 69. While the 
court in Ash ultimately held that plaintiffs' allegations were insufficient to attribute knowledge of 
the red flags to the board, it noted that if plaintiffs were able to allege with some particularity 
that the directors "had actual knowledge" of the wrongdoing, or "knowledge of facts indicating" 
the wrongdoing, and took no action until it was confronted with the wrongdoing directly, such 
facts could excuse demand. Id. at "6. Here, plaintiff has alleged red flags demonstrating that 
the members of the Board had "knowledge of facts indicating" potential price-fixing at Micron 
and took no action to respond until (and, in fact, even after) the DOJ issued a subpoena related 
thereto. Accordingly, defendants face a sufficiently substantial likelihood of liability under 
Caremark, and any demand would therefore have been futile. 
For these reasons, the district erred in granting defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to 
make a demand. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff requests that the Court reverse the district court's order 
and remand this case for further proceedings. 
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